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STUDENT COMMENT
THE HIRING PREFERENCE ORDER AS A REMEDY FOR
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: DOES CARTER V.
GALLAGHER LIMIT THE USE OF ABSOLUTE
PREFERENCE ORDERS?
INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,1
 civil rights groups and individual plaintiffs have been con-
ducting a frontal attack on employment discrimination under the au-
thority of that statute and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 2 In dealing
with these cases, courts continue to encounter violations of fair em-
ployment laws and have sought to remedy both overt and covert'
policies of employment discrimination. In seeking to rectify discrim-
inatory employment practices, courts have utilized their broad equity
powers in the formulation of relief. The trend of recent decisions has
been toward greater activism in the institution of remedial decrees
which affirmatively halt discriminatory employment practices. Reme-
dial judicial decrees have moved from the restrained posture of sim-
ply eliminating overt discriminatory employment practices 4 to the
more activist stance of also attacking deeply ingrained covert prac-
tices and their effects.' In their desire to root out covert discrimina-
tory employment practices, courts have ordered the revision of testing
standards so as to reflect more equitably the qualifications of pro-
spective minority employees° and the utilization of publicity pro-
grams.' The most far reaching remedial solution, however, was that
proposed recently by the United States District Court for the District
1
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970), as amended, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
2
 Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. Specifically, Section 1 of the Act, which
provides that all persons "shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce con-
tracts" has recently been resurrected as a statutory basis for employment discrim-
ination suits against non-governmental employers. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14
Stat. 27, reenacted by § 18 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, Act of May 31, 1870, ch.
114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144, and codified in §§ 1977 and 1978 of the Revised Statutes of
1874, now 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
8 The courts' main problem in the area of employment discrimination is with covert
or "neutral" policies of discrimination. For a discussion of this problem, see Cooper and
Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to
Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1598 (1969). See also
Comment, 1971-1972 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L.
Rev. 1347, 1362-65 (1972).
4
 See, e.g., United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d .544 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio
1968).
5
 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); United States v. Jack-
sonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971).
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, (1971).
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Sheet Metal
Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
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of Minnesota in Carter v. Gallagher.' The district court in Carter
issued a decree instituting an absolute minority preference as a tem-
porary measure to remedy the injustice of past employment discrim-
ination and to prevent future discrimination in the hiring practices
of the Minneapolis Fire Department.° The decree ordered the de-
fendant employer to hire only minority group applicants until such
time as twenty minority employees had been hired." On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the district court's absolute
preference decree, holding it to be violative of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'The court did not, however,
rule all hiring preference plans invalid. Rather than simply dismiss-
ing the order of the district court, the Eighth Circuit modified the
order so as to require the defendant to hire minority applicants on a
one-to-two ratio with whites." Because it drew the line between the
absolute preference order and the limited preference order—holding
the former to be violative of the equal protection clause but the latter
constitutionally acceptable—the Carter decision provides valuable in-
sight into the problem of the limits of judicial power in fashioning
relief in employment discrimination cases.
This comment will examine the minority preference order as a
remedy for racially discriminatory employment practices. The es-
sential question encountered is the limit to which a remedial judi-
cial decree may go in the area of employment discrimination. The
comment will place Carter v. Gallagher under constitutional analysis
in order to determine the permissible bounds of remedial decrees in
this context. It will then examine the effect of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and that statute's antipreferential provision on
the courts' remedial power. Finally, the comment will compare the
remedies for discriminatory employment practices with available rem-
edies for denial of equal educational opportunity.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM
Carter v. Gallagher is the first case to confront the question of
"reverse discrimination" in the form of an absolute preference de-
cree. Carter is significant in that it rejects the absolute minority pref-
erence as a constitutionally acceptable remedial decree. Carter is
also the first case under the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871' 3
to adopt a hiring ratio as part of the remedy.
8 3 FEP Cases 692 (D. Minn. 1971).
9
 Id. at 709.
19 Id.
11 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
12 452 F.2d at 331.
13 Although Carter was not brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, there is no basis for the assertion that its rationale will not apply to cases
brought under that statute. It should be noted, in addition, that Title VII has recently
been amended to include cases of the Carter variety; i.e., cases in which a state or local
governmental employer is involved. 86 Stat. 103, I 2 (1972).
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At the time suit was initiated in Carter v. Gallagher, the Min-
neapolis Fire Department had 535 employees, none of whom was a
member of a minority group. 14 Moreover, there had been only two
minority group employees in the Fire Department in the preceding
twenty-five years" in a city where in recent years non-whites com-
prised 6.44 percent of the population." . Desirous of terminating what
they deemed to be the exclusion of minority members from the Fire
Department, five blacks instituted a class action on behalf of them-
selves and all those similarly situated" under Sections 1981' 8 and
1983" of Title 42 of the United States Code, alleging that the re-
cruitment, examination and hiring practices of the defendants discrim-
inated against minority group job applicants. The plaintiffs prayed
for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to redress the alleged
pattern and practice of racial discrimination which had resulted in
all-white employment in the Minneapolis Fire Department. 2°
The district court concluded that the recruitment, examination,
and hiring practices of the Minneapolis Civil Service Commission'
14





 Id. The non-white percentage figure was derived from the 1970 Census Bureau
Reports,
17
 The classes represented included:
(a) All those Black, Indian and other minority persons presently applying for
employment with the Minneapolis Fire Department.
(b) All those Black, Indian and other minority persons in the City of Minne-
apolis who are not applicants for employment with the Minneapolis Fire Depart-
ment either because their applications were not approved or because they
believed that equal employment opportunity is denied to Black, Indian and
other minority applicants for such employment.
452 F.2d at 317.
18 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions
of every kind, and to no other.
Section 1981 was originally a part of Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Com-
ment, 1971-1972 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, supra note 3, at 1351.
18 42 U.S.C. 4 1983 (1970). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the de-
privation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
20
 3 FEP Cases at 693. The defendants in the action were three members of the
Civil Service Commission of the City of Minneapolis, the Personnel Director of the
Commission, and Fire Chief Kenneth W. Hall. They were sued individually and in their
official capacities. Id, at 694-95.
21
 The Minneapolis Civil Service Commission was responsible for the recruitment,
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were in violation of sections 1981 and 1983 and of the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court's order in part
directed the Civil Service Commission to give "absolute preference" 22
in hiring for the position of fire fighter's to twenty minority appli-
cants who qualified for that position on the basis of revised examina-
tion criteria." On appeal a three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding that the defendants had violated
sections 1981 and 1983, but vacated the "absolute preference" order,
holding that remedy to be violative of the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and of section 1981.23
 The court felt that
section 1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment proscribed all discrim-
ination in employment on account of race whether it be against whites
or blacks." To adopt the remedy suggested by the trial court, the
appellate court reasoned, would be to deprive a superiorly or equally
qualified white applicant of a position merely because of the color
of his skin. The Eighth Circuit found support for its finding in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which expressly prohibits racially
preferential hiring practices."
On rehearing en bane limited to the question of appropriate re-
lief, the Eighth Circuit agreed that the absolute preference order was
constitutionally defective." However, the court did not go so far as
to deprive the district court totally of this type of remedial power."
Rather, the Eighth Circuit modified the order to provide for a hiring
ratio of one minority applicant for every two white applicants until
twenty minority persons had been so hired." Judge Gibson, author
of the revised opinion, did not feel limited by Title VII in formu-
lating a remedy because the action was brought under section 1981
and the Fourteenth Amendment." Nor did the absence of specific
discriminatees render inappropriate relief on a class basis."
In formulating relief to remedy the effects of past discriminatory
hiring practices of the Civil Service Commission, the Eighth Circuit
on rehearing weighed its affirmative duty to eliminate the effects of
examination, and certification of all applicants for the Minneapolis Fire Department and
all other service classifications in the City. Id.
22 Id. at 709.
29
 Fire fighter is the entry position for new employees in the fire department. Id.
at 695.
24
 The court ordered discontinuation of the Civil Service Commission's examination
plans for fire fighter and the validation of new examinations consistent with the guide-
lines set forth in the "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Em-
ployment Testing Procedures," 29 C.F.R. I 1607.1-.14 (1971). Id. at 710.
25 452 F.2d at 325.
29 Id.
27
 Id. at 327-28. The relevant language of Title VII is quoted in the text accompany-
ing notes 68 and 69 infra.




 Id. at 329.
82
 Id. at 330.
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racial discrimination against the constitutional proscriptions of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." In grappling
with these conflicting interests the court viewed the absolute prefer-
ence decree of the district court as having exceeded permissible con-
stitutional bounds." The Eighth Circuit felt that affirming the order
which granted absolute preference to minority groups as a class would
result in reverse discrimination against equally or superiorly qualified
white applicants in violation of their constitutional rights under the
equal protection clause." In seeking to find constitutionally accept-
able relief, the court concluded that a hiring ratio of one minority
applicant to two white applicants until twenty qualified minority ap-
plicants had been hired would be equitable in light of the circum-
stances of the case." The court emphasized that as soon as the
number of minority fire fighters reached a level consistent with their
numbers in the general population, hiring would return to a racially
neutral basis."
A careful constitutional analysis of Carter's ruling is instructive
in the formulation of the limits of remedial judicial decrees in the
area of employment discrimination. It is submitted that the court
was correct in finding the absolute preference order constitutionally
impermissible in the context of the existing fact situation. It is further
submitted that, since the facts of Carter are fairly typical of em-
ployment discrimination cases, it will be a rare case in which the
absolute preference decree will be an appropriate remedy.
As a matter of constitutional interpretation, racial classifications
by the Government are suspect and are placed under the most rigid
examination." In order to pass constitutional review there must be
a showing of a compelling governmental interest furthered by the
use of such a classification, which interest must outweigh the interest
of the individuals discriminated against by the racial classification."
Further, the governmental action in question must be shown to be
necessary to the furtherance of the compelling governmental interest;
i.e., there must be no less drastic means of achieving the stated goal."





80 Id. at 331.
87 Id.
28 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
89 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964). It has been suggested by a recent commentator that the more lenient "rational
relationship" test be utilized when the purpose for using a racial classification is to
remedy the effects of racial discrimination. He asserts that such a "benign" use of racial
distinctions should pass constitutional scrutiny without the need to show as heavy a
justification as is normally required of such suspect categorizations. Developments
in the Law—Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1106, 1115 (1969).
40 Id. at 1132.
41 380 U.S. 145 (1964).
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use of the compelling interest test by district courts when fashioning
relief to eradicate the present effects of past discrimination and to
prevent discrimination in the future." Color-consciousness, then, is
clearly recognized and accepted in judicial decrees which seek to
redress the effects of past discriminatory hiring practices, so long as
a sufficiently compelling governmental interest which is furthered by
the decree can be shown."
Both the district court's decree of absolute minority hiring pref-
erence and the Eighth Circuit's decree of a hiring ratio were for-
mulated on lines which were clearly color-conscious. It is beyond
argument that they constituted racial classifications and hence had
to satisfy the compelling interest test. Therefore, to withstand con-
stitutional scrutiny, the decrees had to be shown to be necessary to
the furtherance of a compelling governmental interest which out-
weighed the competing interest of the white job applicants whose
employment opportunities were hampered by them.
The governmental interest involved in Carter was the elimina-
tion of the present effects of past discrimination. This interest, it
is argued, is furthered by the absolute preference order of the district
court and by the quota hiring plan ordered by the Eighth Circuit in
Carter. However, the decrees would fall as unconstitutionally viola-
tive of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if
the interest of white job applicants in equal employment opportunity
outweighed the interest of the Government in eradicating the pres-
ent effects of past discrimination against minority applicants as a
class," or if the governmental interest could be vindicated through
less drastic measures.
The primary purpose of the absolute preference order was to
eradicate the chilling effect" which twenty-five years of racially dis-
criminatory hiring practices had had on prospective minority appli-
cants for the position of fire fighter." The racially discriminatory
hiring policies and resulting absence of minority group fire fighters
in the community had a chilling effect on the desire of minority ap-
42 In approving the discontinuation of racially discriminatory voting laws in
Louisiana, the Court stated: "We bear in mind that the court has not merely the power
but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory
effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future." Id. at 154.
43 Contractors Ass'n v. Schultz, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854
(1971); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College District, 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d
907 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.
Supp. 505 (ED. Va. 1968).
44 Developments in the Law—Equal Protection, supra note 39, at 1132.
45 The Eighth Circuit on rehearing stated with respect to the chilling effect: "Given
the past discriminatory hiring policies of the Minneapolis Fire Department, which were
well known in the minority community, it is not unreasonable to assume that minority
persons will still be reluctant to apply for employment, absent some positive assurance
that if qualified they will in fact be hired on a more than token basis." 452 F.2d at 331.
Cf. United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 132 (8th Cir. 1969);
Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 301 F. Supp. 97, 102 (M.D.N.C. 1969).
45 452 F.2d at 331.
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plicants to apply for positions." The Carter court wanted future
nondiscriminatory hiring to be fully effective in creating more rep-
resentative minority employment in the fire department." In order
to accomplish this objective, the court felt, prospective minority ap-
plicants needed positive assurance that applications submitted by
them would not simply be ignored." The Carter court felt that af-
firmative action was required in order to dispel this attitude of
futility," and to show the minority communities that they would be
fully represented in the fire department. Such judicial encouragement
at the outset was required in this case so that the nondiscriminatory
hiring practices and procedures decreed by the court would in fact
lead to equal employment opportunity . 0
To accomplish the goal of eradicating the effects of the defen-
dant's discriminatory practices, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's decree implementing an affirmative action mandate for
the recruitment of minority applicants." Affirmative action here in-
cluded the use of all available communications sources to reach the
minority communities for the purpose of promoting applications for
fire fighter." The district court did not feel that mere publicity would
be sufficient to dispel the chilling effect." The court concluded that
only purposeful hiring of qualified minority applicants, which would
take the form of an absolute preference decree, could eradicate the
chilling effect of past discriminatory hiring practices."
The Eighth Circuit disagreed." Although it recognized the need to
provide concrete assurance to prospective minority applicants, it felt
that this goal could be achieved through less drastic measures than
an absolute preference order." Hence the implication of the court's
holding was that the benefits to be obtained through the absolute
preference order did not outweigh that order's detrimental effect.
Framed in terms of the compelling interest test, the Eighth Circuit
held that, although the governmental interest in eradicating the pres-
ent effects of past discrimination did outweigh the interest of the
47 The trial court in Carter observed that
[T]he minority community has viewed the Minneapolis Fire Department as
an agency of the city in which they were not welcome. • • . [T]he breadth of
this had reputation results, as much as anything, from the fact that minority
persons had not seen their fellows on fire trucks over the past twenty-five
years.
3 FEP Cases at 699.
45 452 F.2d at 331.
49 Id.
50 The court relied upon Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1964), to support
the legitimacy of such action. 452 F.2d at 328.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 326.
55 3 FE? Cases at 710.
64 Id. at 708.
55 Id.
56 452 F.2d at 325.
57 Id. at 331.
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white job applicants in equal job opportunity, the governmental in-
terest could be furthered by means less drastic than the absolute
preference order.58
It is submitted that the Eighth Circuit's refusal to endorse the
absolute preference decree is based on sound application of constitu-
tional principles. An absolute minority preference in hiring was not
necessary in order to create a favorable attitude in the minority com-
munities towards the fire department." A hiring ratio would, in all
probability, achieve comparable success in redressing the chilling effect
on minority applications. The effective difference between the absolute
preference and the hiring ratio in Carter was time. It would require
more time to place twenty qualified minority applicants on a one-for-
two basis,°° than it would by granting an absolute preference to twenty.
Time was not of the essence in Carter. The importance of an affirma-
tive hiring decree in the minority communities was of a psychological
nature. Tangible, positive assurance that minority group applicants
would actually be hired on more than just a token basis would be
sufficient to dispel long-held notions of discriminatory hiring practices.
A hiring ratio, as proposed by the Eighth Circuit, could accomplish this
objective as effectively as an absolute preference, but without the oner-
ous collateral consequences of the latter type of remedy.
With the conclusion that a hiring ratio is a viable remedial alter-
native in Carter, the absolute preference decree definitely fails to pass
constitutional scrutiny in that case. This is so because in order for a
governmental action involving a racial classification to meet the re-
quirements of the compelling interest test, there must be available no
88 Id.
59
 Courts have recognized the acceptability of an absolute preference in hiring
identifiable persons who were victims of discriminatory hiring practices. United States v.
Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971) (affirmed
the district court's order for defendant unions to immediately refer for construction
work those persons who were previously subject to discriminatory practices) ; Local 53,
Int'l Ass'n of Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (affirmed the
district court's order requiring the defendant union to admit four previous discriminatees
and grant job referrals for nine others). However, Carter was not concerned with
identifiable persons who were subject to discriminatory practices. Rather, the court was
dealing with minorities as a class.
The Fourth Circuit may be faced with the issue of absolute preference in the near
future. In a case involving racial discrimination in employment under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970), the United States District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina in United States v. Central Motor
Lines, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 478 (W.D.N.C. 1970), formulated a preliminary order. The
court ordered the defendant trucking company to hire six qualified blacks without delay
as over-the-road drivers and hire on a one-to-one basis any persons hired after those
six. The six blacks were not identifiable previous discriminatees. The order to hire six
qualified blacks can only be construed as an absolute minority preference decree. The
decree in Central Motors, after an adjudication on the merits, 338 F. Supp. 532
(W.DN.C. 1971), approved of the one-to-one hiring ratio but did not refer to the
absolute preference order. An appellate decision has not as yet been reported.
69 Sixty fire fighter positions would be required to fulfill this order. This means
more than a 105 turnover if the department size is not increased.
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less drastic means of furthering the stated governmental interest. By
rejecting the absolute preference decree of the district court, but
instituting a limited hiring preference order, the Eighth Circuit helps
to define the permissible constitutional limits of affirmative relief to
redress the present effects of past discrimination.
The decision in Carter can be extended beyond its particular facts.
In most employment discrimination cases an absolute preference
decree would fail to pass constitutional analysis. Except where identi-
fiable previous discriminatees are involved," courts will seldom en-
counter situations in which the overriding necessity of an absolute
preference decree, coupled with the unavailability of less onerous viable
alternatives, outweighs the potentially harmful reverse discriminatory
results. However, if a court should feel that time is of the essence in
the implementation of a remedial decree, and that accordingly a
limited hiring ratio decree will not serve adequately to eliminate the
lingering effects of past discrimination, the absolute minority pref-
erence may prove acceptable if it is of a temporary nature.
The limited hiring ratio decree itself was also arguably susceptible
to a charge of unconstitutionality. However, the Carter court felt that
it was absolutely necessary to order the hiring of minority group fire-
fighters in order to eradicate the chilling effect which decades of dis-
criminatory practices had brought about. Hence, since no less drastic
viable alternative existed, it would appear that the limited ratio decree
of the Eighth Circuit satisfies the requirements of the compelling
interest test.
The Supreme Court has recognized that in the formulation of
equitable relief courts are free to resort to mathematical ratios." Such
ratios may be used to guide the court in the fashioning of a decree
suited to the circumstances of the particular case, but their utilization
is to be made with an eye towards flexibility. 63
 In justification of its
decree for a mathematically-based minority preference, the Eighth
Circuit explained that its order of a one-to-two hiring ratio did not
establish a permanent quota system." The court stated that once the
twenty minority positions had been filled under the decree, hiring
would then be conducted on a strictly nonpreferential basis."
01 See note 59 supra.
02
 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971).
68 Id.
64 452 F.2d at 330.
05
 Id. Judge Van Oosterhout, who had written the Eighth Circuit's opinion, dis-
sented on rehearing. He felt that a hiring ratio would have a reverse discriminatory effect.
He reasoned that affirmative action which included recruitment publicity but eliminated
minority preference and hiring ratios, was as far as the court was constitutionally per-
mitted to proceed. Id. at 332.
For a discussion of the necessity of quota hiring see: Leiken, Preferential Treatment
in the Skilled Building Trades: An Analysis of the Philadelphia Plan, 56 Cornell L. Rev.
84, 98-100 (1970); Comment, The Philadelphia Plan and Strict Racial Quotas on Federal
Contracts, 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 817, 827-35 (1970). But see Kaplan, Equal Justice in an
305
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Hiring ratios have been utilized by other courts in cases involving
discriminatory hiring practices." Courts are acutely aware of their
responsibility to tread softly and to utilize hiring ratios sparingly. The
Carter court sensed this need to maintain flexibility in its decree.
The hiring ratio was of a temporary nature and was tailored to the
particular circumstances of the case." In future employment dis-
crimination cases, courts seeking guidance in the formulation of reme-
dial decrees should not look simply to the fact that Carter utilized a
minority hiring ratio. Rather, they should look closely at the reasons
behind the use of a hiring ratio in that case. The courts should closely
scrutinize the appropriateness and necessity of a hiring ratio and the
possible effectiveness of less suspect alternatives with reference to the
circumstances of the individual cases.
In sum, the limits of remedial judicial decrees to redress the
effects of employment discrimination set by the Carter decision should
prove to be guiding precedent. Under the Carter rule, only in cases
where there are previous identifiable discriminatees or where time is
of the essence in the institution of a remedial decree may courts
utilize the absolute minority preference order.
Constitutional proscription, however, is not the only factor which
must be weighed in determining the acceptability of remedial decrees.
Statutory prohibitions must also be closely scrutinized for possible
areas of conflict with such decrees. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 is one such statute which must be examined closely to deter-
mine if further limits are to be placed upon the courts' power to imple-
ment remedial decrees in the area of employment discrimination.
II. THE STATUTORY PROBLEMS: TITLE VII OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Although the hiring preference decrees of both the district court
and the Eighth Circuit in Carter were not predicated on Title VII,
the language of this statute casts doubt upon the capacity of the courts
to employ such means to cure discriminatory employment patterns.
Specifically, section 703 (a) provides: "It shall be an unlawful employ-
Unequal World: Equality for the Negro—The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 363, 363-88 (1966).
66 Contractors Ass'n v. Schultz, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854
(1971) (the Third Circuit suggested a one-to-one ratio of whites to blacks as an in-
formal guideline to aid contractors meet their "good faith effort" hiring obligations
pursuant to Executive Order No. 11246); Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Asbestos Workers v.
Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
order requiring the union to alternate white and black work referrals); United States v.
Lathers Local 46, 4 FEP Cases 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (the district court ordered the
union to issue work permits in a one-to-one ratio of whites to blacks); United States v.
Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (the district court ap-
proved the preliminary order instituting a one-to-one hiring ratio of whites to blacks).
67 452 F.2d at 330. The court felt that a one-to-two hiring ratio, as opposed to a
one-to-one ratio, was equitable in that the minority population in Minneapolis in 1970
was only 6.44 percent. Id. at 323, 331.
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ment practice for an employer—(1.) to fail or refuse to hire or dis-
charge any individual .. • because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.""
Title VII also contains provisions which seemingly proscribe any
form of racially preferential treatment in the hiring process. Section
703(j) provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to
require any employer . • . to grant preferential treatment to
any individual or to any group because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account
of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total
number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin employed by an employer . . . in com-
parison with the total number or percentage of persons of
such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any com-
munity, State, section, or other area, or in the available work
force in any community, State, section, or other area."
These provisions, when read alone, appear to be clear limitations
on the remedial power of the courts insofar as hiring preference orders
are concerned. It is clear that the modified order of the Eighth Circuit
in Carter, as well as the absolute preference order of the district court,
required the employer to "fail or refuse to hire"—at least temporarily
—white job applicants because of their race or color. It is equally clear
that the order required the employer "to grant preferential treatment"
—again temporarily—to minority group applicants "on account of an
imbalance which . . . [existed] with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of any race . . . employed by . . . [the Fire De-
partment] . . . in comparison with the total number or percentage of
persons of such race . . . in [the] community." Hence the court's
decree would appear, at first blush, to order the defendant employer
to violate Title VII.
These antipreferential provisions, however, must be read in the
context of the entire Act in order to elucidate the extent of their limita-
tion. Section 706(g) of the Act empowers the district courts to "order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may . . . include
. . . hiring of employees . ."" Read in light of the Supreme Court's
holding in Griggs v. Duke Power Co." that Title VII empowers the
courts to eliminate the present effects of past discrimination," Sec-
es 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
09 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
70 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970), as amended, 86 Stat. 103, § 4 (1972).
71 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
72 The Griggs Court stated that: "Under the Act, practices, procedures or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." Id. at
430. The Court further observed that courts formulating remedies for Title VII violations
are required to remove "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
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tion 706(g) becomes a broad mandate to courts formulating remedies
for discriminatory employment practices.
The Carter court recognized its duty to eliminate the continuing
effects of the embedded discriminatory employment practices of the
Minneapolis Fire Department." It further recognized that this goal
could not be attained with any reasonable haste so long as potential
minority group applicants were discouraged from applying for employ- .
ment by the knowledge that in the past it had appeared impossible
for non-whites to be hired by the Department. Hence, the court con-
cluded that it was necessary to impose a limited hiring ratio on the
Department in order to erase the psychological effects of years of dis-
crimination. In short, it felt that the only way to do away with the
feeling of futility was to provide concrete evidence—by ordering the
hiring of a limited number of minority group fire fighters—that a non-
white would not be wasting his time in applying for a position with the
Department.
Assuming that a court in a Title VII case is correct in its belief
that the limited hiring preference order is necessary to eliminate the
effects of decades of discriminatory hiring practices, it can fairly be
said that it is compelled to issue that order since its duty under the
Griggs interpretation of the remedial provisions of Title VII is to
eradicate the present effects of past discrimination. Hence it would
create an inconsistency within the Act to interpret Sections 703 (a)
and 703 (j) as prohibiting remedial orders of the Carter type where the
court finds that such an order is absolutely necessary to eradicate such
effects. It is submitted, then, that sections 703 (a) and 703(j) should
be interpreted as prohibiting only permanent hiring preference orders.
Section 703 (a) makes it unlawful for an employer to "fail or refuse
to hire ... any individual ... because of ... race." In order to recon-
cile this language with the Griggs interpretation of Section 706(g)
and the hiring preference order, it must be asserted that the hiring
preference order does not require the employer permanently to "fail
or refuse to hire" white job applicants because of their race or color,
but rather merely to delay hiring them until the court's order has been
complied with. Likewise, section 703 (j) must be read as a prohibition
only against establishment of a permanent quota system whose pur-
pose is to provide an employee complement which reflects the racial
mix of the community.
The criteria for legality, then, would appear to be that the order
be temporary, that it be implemented with the goal of eliminating the
lingering effects of past discriminatory practices, and that it be neces-
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other im-
permissible classification." Id. at 431.
78 This duty was expressly recognized by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972), in which the court reversed the district
court because of its failure to institute a hiring ratio. The First Circuit held that only
through this type of remedy could the court effectively fulfill its duty to eliminate the
present effects of past discrimination.
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sary to the attainment of that goal. The scope of any given order will
be shaped by these factors. In some instances, the court may find that
the institution of objective hiring criteria will suffice." In such a case,
a hiring preference order—limited or absolute—would fail to satisfy
the criterion of necessity. A particularly embedded discriminatory em-
ployment pattern may, however, call for more drastic remedies. If this
be the case, then the absolute preference order may be adopted as the
only viable tool capable of eliminating the discriminatory employment
situation.
In recent years, courts have generally adopted a broad interpreta-
tion of the remedial provisions of Title VII in formulating affirmative
action remedies. For example, in Local 53, Int'l. Ass'n. of, Asbestos
Workers v. Vogler," the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted relief
based on Section 706(g) of Title VII, asserting that: "the courts are
not limited to simply parroting the Act's prohibitions but are per-
mitted, if not required, to order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate."" To fulfill this' mandate, the Vogler court ordered im-
mediate admission to union membership of those who had been pre-
viously excluded on account of race." In addition, the court eliminated
work experience gained prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act as
a criterion for union membership." The court also ordered alternate
white and black work referrals until the union developed objective
membership criteria." The Fifth Circuit discounted the defendant's
contention that it was establishing a quota system to correct a racial
imbalance in violation of section 703 (j)." The remedy merely assured
that the administration of the referral system would henceforth be void
of discrimination.
With marked unanimity, other courts have followed the mandate
expressed in Vogler and have refused to permit the antipreferential
treatment section of Title VII to thwart the elimination of all, vestiges
of discrimination in employment. This trend towards affirmative judi-
cial action was further illustrated in United States v. Ironworkers
Local 86.81 The district court there had entered a far-reaching decree
not only enjoining the unions from engaging in future discrimination,
but also ordering them to offer immediate construction referrals to
certain individuals, to fully apprise the Negro community of the new
opportunities available to blacks in the construction trade, and to
create special apprenticeship programs designed to meet the special
needs of the average black with no experience or skill in the profes-
74 Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
7° 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
70 Id. at 1052.
77 Id. at 1053.
78 Id. at 1054.
70 Id. at 1051.
0° Id. at 1054-55.
81 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
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sion." The union, on appeal, asserted that the immediate job referrals
as well as the special training programs designed to increase the
numbers of blacks within the trade, violated Section 703 (j) of the
1964 Civil Rights Act." Despite the claims of preferential treatment
and racial quotas, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals felt that section
706(g) necessitated such a remedy." The district court did no more
than remove the vestiges of past discrimination and ensure the non-
existence of future barriers to equal employment opportunities for
qualified blacks.85
 To deny the courts such powers, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned, would be to render ineffectual the congressional desire to
eliminate all forms of discrimination."
By focusing on the congressional mandate of creating equal em-
ployment opportunity, the courts have been able to resolve the am-
biguities of Title VII. To interpret the Act's antipreferential sections
as prohibiting Carter-type orders would be to allow the effects of illegal
employment practices to linger on intolerably. In United States v.
IBEW, Local 38,87 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a
district court decision which specifically precluded any affirmative
relief designed to eliminate the continuing effects of past discriminatory
practices.88 The appellate court realized that racially neutral policies
are often ineffectual in remedying an employment pattern based on
decades of discrimination." The court recognized that Section 703(j)
could be interpreted to prohibit the mandatory requirement of pref-
erential treatment solely to correct an imbalance in racial employment,
but the court observed that a reading of the remainder of the Act
revealed that only by allowing the courts wide remedial powers could
the Act's stated purpose be attained." Thus, a broad reading of Title
VII required a reversal of the district court's passive policy. Such a
broad interpretation of Title VII seems perfectly consistent with the
goal of removing the present effects of past discrimination and with
the Supreme Court's mandate in Louisiana v. United States, 9' a voting
rights case in which the Court stated that: "the court has not merely
the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible
eliminate discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like dis-
crimination in the future." 0" When read in a broad light, then, Title
VII does not pose a great threat to the type of "preferential" remedy
employed in Carter and in earlier cases. As the district court in United
82 Id. at 548.
88 Id. at 552-53
84 Id. at 553.
80 Id,
88 Id.
Ea 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
88 Id. at 146
89 Id. at 149.
99 Id. at 149-54
01 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
92 Id. at 154.
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States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc." said in ordering alternate Negro
and white hiring: "The Court in ordering relief is seeking to correct
the current and future effects of past discrimination and to restore the
victims to their rightful status. It therefore is not limited by the pro-
hibition in section 703 (j), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (j).""
The rationale for compensatory hiring as a lawful remedy in
unfair employment situations was most recently elaborated by the
First Circuit in Castro v. Beecher." The district court had previously
found that the Civil Service Examination for the selection of police
officers had discriminated against minority groups. The lower court
refused to order preferential hiring, however, because of constitutional
reasons.' The First Circuit found, however, that the district court's
failure to institute a hiring ratio was a dereliction of its duty to eradi-
cate effectively the present effects of past discrimination in the employ-
ment process." Unless affirmative relief in the police selection process
was forthcoming, the dynamics would be such as "to relegate to the
remote future the achievement of significant representation of black
and Spanish-surnamed persons on the metropolitan or Commonwealth
police forces." The court then ordered that the Civil Service Examina-
tion be revised so as not unnecessarily to discriminate against minority
groups, and that a separate hiring pool be created for those minority
persons who passed the revised examination. One member of this
minority employment pool was then to be selected for certification as
a police officer on a ratio to be determined by the district court on
remand. This procedure was to continue until the minority pool was
exhausted." The First Circuit refused, however, to give this remedy a
permanent existence.'" As Judge Coffin said: "Such a result would be
to translate what is a discretionary power of courts in giving relief to
a mandatory standing obligation."'" This interpretation closely follows
the congressional intent regarding Title VII as expressed in an Inter-
pretive Memorandum submitted by Senators Clark and Case, the floor
managers of the bill:
There is no requirement in title VII that an employer main-
tain a racial balance in his work force. On the contrary, any
deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever such
a balance may be, would involve a violation of title VII
93 338 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
94 Id. at 56Q
95 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972)
9° 334 F. Supp. 930, 938 (D. Mass. 1971). Judge Wyzanski did not refer specifically
to any section of the Constitution in reaching this conclusion. However, it may reason-
ably be inferred that he was referring to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
07 459 F.2d at 730.
08 Id.
00 Id. at 737,
100 Id. at 733.
101 Id.
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'because maintaining such a balance would require an em-
ployer to hire or refuse to hire on the basis of race."'
It is submitted that this interpretation of section 703 (j) of Title
VII suggests that while a racial hiring quota or compensatory hiring
cannot be permanently required of an employer, it can be used as a
temporary device to remedy the effects of past discrimination. The
difference between permanent as opposed to temporary racial balancing
distinguishes preferential treatment—which is prohibited by sections
703 (a) and 703 (j)—from remedial treatment which is mandated by
section 706(g). In Carter, precisely this point was made. After the
twenty minority group persons were hired, the selection process was
to become racially neutral."' The failure to take such action would
allow the effects of past discrimination to linger on intolerably. With
qualified minority persons on the force, the Minneapolis Fire Depart-
ment would no longer represent a racially undesirable place of employ-
ment for minorities in the city of Minneapolis. The remedy in Carter
was remedial, not preferential.
It may be argued, however, that this reasoning is equally appli-
cable to the absolute preference order of the district court in Carter.
Indeed, the absolute preference order would accomplish the stated
goal in a shorter period of time and therefore be even less permanent
than the limited preference order of the Eighth Circuit. It appears,
however, that, given the existence of a less drastic remedy—the limited
preference order—the absolute hiring preference order fails to satisfy
the criterion that the remedy be necessary to attainment of the stated
goal, and hence is outside the scope of the courts' remedial power
under Title VII.
Although remedial as opposed to preferential action is not pro-
scribed by Title VII or the Fourteenth Amendment, such action is
bound to affect adversely the members of the white majority who
benefited under the old, discriminatory system. In Vogler v. McCarty,
Inc.,'" the Fifth Circuit dealt with this problem. The district court
had ordered the implementation of a system of alternate white and
black referrals which adversely affected the rights of the white workers
under a collective bargaining agreement."" Dispelling immediately the
contention that such a remedy exceeded the discretionary power of the
trial court, the Fifth Circuit asserted that the adequate protection of
Negro rights under Title VII would in many instances require some
adjustment of the rights of white employees."' The courts had to be
given the freedom to deal equitably with the conflicting interests at
102 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964) (emphasis added).
103 452 F.2d at 330.
104 451 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1971).
105 Id. at 1238
108 Id.
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stake to fashion remedies which would redress the grievances of pre-
-vious discriminatees.1"
One court, in an attempt to interpret the apparently conflicting
provisions of Title VII consistently, has adopted traditional equity
principles to define the extent of permissible court-ordered remedies.
In United States v. Lathers, Local 461°8 the District Court for the
Southern District of New York realized that the achievement of equal
employment opportunity for previously excluded minorities was im-
possible without adversely affecting the existing labor force.'" The
court then proceeded to order the issuance of work permits in a one-
to-one ratio until the number of minority persons within the trade
approximated their numbers in the general population.' 1° The minimal
injury to the white labor force which such an action entailed compared
with the great benefit to be conferred on the minorities justified this
action which, the court said, was necessary to carry out the purposes
of Title VII."' It was precisely this type of balancing of interests
which occurred in Carter. It would appear, then, that what Judge Van
Oosterhout saw in his dissent in Carter as a violation of the constitu-
tional rights of white applicants, was really the adjustment of conflict-
ing interests.
As these cases illustrate, Title VII, despite its strong antipref-
erential provisions, is not generally perceived as a threat to the broad
equitable power of the courts to remedy the present effects of past
discrimination. As long as these affirmative action remedies are of
temporary duration and are necessary to the successful implementation
of equal employment opportunity they will not run afoul of either con-
stitutional or statutory proscriptions.
III. REMEDIES FOR DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS: AN ANALOGY
The achievement of equal employment opportunity is a clearly
stated goal of national policy.' 12 There is, however, uncertainty as to
how far the courts can go in remedying the lingering effects of past
discrimination without unduly infringing upon the rights of the major-
ity. Although the Supreme Court has not yet spoken on the question
of preferential hiring orders it has frequently expressed its views in
the analogous area of school desegregation remedies. In education, as
in employment, rights basic to decent human existence are at stake.
Similarly, both areas have been plagued by invidious forms of racial
107 Id. at 1238-39.
108 4 FEP Cases 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
"9 Id. at 576-77.
110 Id. at 575.
111 Id. at 576
112 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970).
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discrimination. Thus, what holds true in the field of education may
reasonably be imputed to the area of equal employment opportunity.
The most recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court in the area
of equal educational opportunity was in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Board of Education,na in which the Court reviewed the scope of
powers of the federal courts to eliminate racially separate public
schools. 114
 The courts, since the decision in Green v. County School
Board"' have been charged "with the affirmative duty to take what-
ever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary school system in
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."'"
Also according to Green, the validity of an affirmative action plan
was to be determined according to the likelihood of its success.' With
this duty in mind, Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the unanimous
court in Swann, reasserted the broad equitable powers available to the
district courts to remedy past wrongs.'" To uphold this authority, the
Court rebutted the contention that Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act limited the equitable powers of the district courts in dealing with
racial discrimination in education.'" The pertinent sections of Title
IV which seemed to threaten the remedial powers of the courts were
textually very similar to those sections of Title VII which cast doubt
on the legality of the remedy in Carter. Section 2000c(b) defines de-
segregation as used in Title IV:
"Desegregation" means the assignment of students to public
schools and within such schools without regard to their race,
color, religion, or national origin but "desegregation" shall
not mean the assignment of students to public schools in
order to overcome racial imbalance.' 2°
Similarly, section 2000c-6 also seems to restrict the remedial powers
of the courts:
Nothing herein shall empower any official or court of the
United States to issue any order seeking to achieve a racial
balance in any school by requiring the transportation of
pupils or students from one school to another in order to
achieve such racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing
power of the court to insure compliance with constitutional
standards."'
Since both Title IV and Title VII arise from the Civil Rights
115 402 U.S. 1 (1970).
114 Id. at 5
115 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
Ile Id. at 437-38.
117 Id. at 439.
118 402 U.S. at 15.
119 Id. at 16.
125 42 U.S.C. 2000c(b) (1970).
121 42 U.S.C. 2000c-6(a) (1970).
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Act of 1964, it would seem that a similar interpretation would be ap-
plicable to both provisions. The unanimity of the Court also renders
unlikely divergent views regarding such analogous areas as education
and employment.
As many lower courts had ruled in cases dealing with equal em-
ployment remedies and Title VII, the Supreme Court ruled in Swann
that Title IV did not limit the power of the federal courts in imple-
menting remedies to end dual school systems.'" The Court ruled that
Title IV in no way restricted the historic equitable powers of the
courts and that the validity of any remedy would have to be deter-
mined by recourse to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.123 The Court therefore had to pass on the constitutionality
of the 71-29 percent racial balance which the district court required
of the individual schools.'" Just as the remedy in Carter created a
racial balance in apparent violation of Title VII, it could be argued
that the Swann Court's plan violated Title IV as well as the Fourteenth
Amendment by resorting to obvious racial classification. The Supreme
Court pointed out that if it read the holding of the district court to
require, as of right, a racial balance, they would have to reverse.'
Chief Justice Burger felt, however, that the use of such mathematical
ratios was "no more than a starting point in the process of shaping a
remedy rather than an inflexible requirement.'"" Also, the Court em-
phasized that an awareness of the racial composition of the school
system is likely to prove quite useful in shaping a remedy to correct
past constitutional violations.127 The Court also recognized that an
effective remedy would likely cause some difficulties for those ac-
customed to the old dual pattern of school assignment.'" Racially
neutral assignment plans were seen as inadequate to counteract the
continuing effects of past school desegregation.'"
Swann is strikingly analogous to Carter. In Carter, a racially
neutral plan was seen as an ineffective tool to correct the effects of
years of discriminatory hiring practices. Although the remedy was
color-conscious, it did not impose a permanent racial quota upon the
Minneapolis Fire Department in violation of either Title VII or the
Fourteenth Amendment. There also existed a temporary disadvantage
for those white applicants with numerically higher test scores; how-
ever, it was decided that because of the imprecision of the test scores,
the preferential classification of qualified minority applicants did not
take on the nature of an invidious racial classification in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the 1964 Civil Rights Act was
122 402 U.S. at 16.
123 Id. at 18.
124 Id. at 23.
125 Id. at 24.
126 Id. at 25
121 Id.
128 Id. at 28.
129 Id.
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not viewed as an obstacle to remedying the results of past discrimina-
tion in either case.
Although education and employment are not identical rights,
they are equally fundamental to decent human existence; accordingly,
in light of the Swann decision, it is submitted that in appropriate cases
courts may and should use remedies entailing hiring ratios as long as
they are temporary and remedial in nature and do not invidiously
discriminate against the white labor force.
CONCLUSION
A hiring ratio is an appropriate as well as a legally sound tool for
remedying the present day effects of previous discrimination. In
Carter, the Eighth Circuit ordered a ratio that met the legal standards
required to ensure the validity of its decree.'" The ratio was of tem-
porary duration—once twenty minority group applicants were hired,
employment would return to a racially neutral basis—and the order
was essential for the achievement of the statutory goal of equal employ-
ment opportunity. The absolute preference ordered by the district court
failed precisely because it did not satisfy this latter criterion: an
absolute preference simply was not necessary to attain equal employ-
ment opportunity. This failure, however, should not be interpreted as
precluding all use of absolute preference decrees. For example, had
time been considered to be of the essence in Carter, it would appear
that the Eighth Circuit could have chosen to affirm the district court's
use of the absolute hiring preference as an order necessary to attain
the statutory goal in question.
DANIEL M. CRANE
LYLE J. MORRIS
1" Underlying all the standards discussed at length in this comment is another
that is a "given": the requirement that the minority applicants qualify for the job.
As defined by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971),
the definition of "qualified" is closely tied to a strict concept of business necessity. For
example, tests as conditions of employment are required to be related specifically to on-
the-job performance. In Carter, the Eighth Circuit carefully limited its order so as to
encompass only qualified minority group applicants. 451 F.2d at 331. An example of the
force of this underlying requirement was recently illustrated in Commonwealth v. O'Neill,
4 FEP Cases 1286, 1288 (3d Cir. 1972). There, the Third Circuit vacated the district
court's order establishing a minority hiring pool because the pool was not limited to
applicants who necessarily qualified for the position.
'316
